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SOME APPEASEMENT FOR PROFESSOR TUSHNET*
PENNY J. WHITE"

Last fall in the University of San Francisco Law Review, Professor Mark
Tushnet-one of the keynote speakers at this symposium celebrating the twohundredth anniversary of Marbury v. Madison'-published an insightful
article, entitled A Goldilocks Account of Judicial Review?,2 in response to
Christopher Eisgruber's book, ConstitutionalSelf-Government.3 As Professor
Tushnet explained, the "allusion to Goldilocks is inescapable" given Professor
Eisgruber's desire that "judicial review ...be neither too cold nor too hot, but
just right." In conclusion, however, Professor Tushnet commented that "the
5
Goldilocks story is included in collections of fairy tales" for a reason.
With that in mind, I begin by carefully advising that my comments about
judicial review go beyond the critique of Professor Eisgruber's Goldilocksian
desire (that judicial review be "just right") to my own Goldilocksian belief
courts, is "just right")
(that judicial review, as exercised by the majority of the
6
and should probably be entitled "Pollyanna's Points."
Why do I believe that judicial review is not too cold, not too hot, but just
right? And why do I doubt that such a view is akin to a fairytale? Before I
answer these questions, I would first like, in keeping with the tradition of the
day, to resurrect some of Chief Justice Marshall's language in Marbury. I find
it noteworthy that Marshall described the issue before the United States
Supreme Court as "deeply interesting to the United States; but ...not of an

* Address at the Marbury v. Madison: 200 Years of Judicial Review in America
Symposium at the University of Tennessee College of Law (Feb. 21,2003) (revised Apr. 2003)
(transcript on file with the Tennessee Law Review).
** Penny J. White is an Associate Professor of Law at the University of Tennessee
College of Law. She previously served as a Judge for the State of Tennessee Circuit Court, as
a Judge on the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals, and as an Associate Justice on the
Tennessee Supreme Court.
!. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
2.

Mark Tushnet, A Goldilocks Account of Judicial Review?, 37 U.S.F. L. REv. 63

(2002).
CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL
4. Tushnet, supra note 2, at 87.
3.

SELF-GOVERNMENT

(2001).

5. Id.
6. The analogy is, of course, to the book by Eleanor Hodgman Porter. The story of
Pollyanna Whittier, a children's classic, was published in 1913. After she is orphaned,

Pollyanna moves in with her harsh maiden aunt but, nevertheless, has an amazing effect on
everyone as a result of her cheerful and infectious optimism. Despite her personality, Pollyanna
faces difficult times, loses her famous happiness, but ultimately finds a way to regain her
historical traits. ELEANOR H. PORTER, POLLYANNA (1913).
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intricacy proportioned to its interest."" Indeed, many of today's commentators
on Marbury have challenged that observation.
Unlike the many distinguished speakers here today, I am neither a
constitutional law scholar nor a constitutional historian. Perhaps the best
accolade I can claim with respect to constitutional law is that Professor Joseph
Cook 8 not only taught me all I know about the subject, but also inspired me to
fashion the Constitution into a sword and a shield for my clients. It must have
worked, for when I practiced law, I earned a nickname among the judges in
my area--"Constitutional Penny."9 One judge commented that I tried to make
a constitutional issue out of everything. Although perhaps impertinent, this
story suggests the perspective from which I address the topic of judicial
review-the perspective of practice, both as a practicing lawyer and as a
practicing judge.
Despite my nickname, I was only successful once, in a practice that lasted
more than a decade, in getting any judge to agree with my argument that a
legislative act violated the Constitution. I remember that case, not for how
important it was, but for how trivial it was-and that, I would suggest, in and
of itself, makes a significant point.
A local governing body passed an ordinance in an effort to curb
Halloween trickery.'" The ordinance made it unlawful to carry loose food
objects, including tomatoes, eggs, and the like, while wearing any type of
costume. Now, all of us know how ridiculous that ordinance was-and that
too, I would suggest, is another significant point. The ordinance was passed
not despite political pressure, but because of it." The ordinance was a direct
result of representative democracy 2 and would have remained law, but for
judicial review and a courageous, independent state court judge in the Unicoi
County General Sessions Court.'3
If the triviality of this example leaves you questioning its relevance,
consider the following fact: the vast majority of court cases in this country are
tried in courts just like the Unicoi County General Sessions Court; they are
tried in state courts (before state judges), not in federal courts 4 --and certainly
7. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).
8. Joseph G. Cook is the Williford Gragg Distinguished Professor of Law at the
University of Tennessee College of Law.
9. See Anthony Borden, "ConstitutionalPenny" Raises Cainin Tennessee, AM. LAW.,
Dec. 1988, at 90, 91.
10. The governing body was the Unicoi County Commission.
11. The ordinance was passed in reaction to vandalism that had occurred in the county
during prior Halloween celebrations.
12. See generallyTENN. CODEANN. §§ 5-1-104, 5-5-102 (1998 & Supp. 2002) (regarding
county commissions).
13. At that time, the Unicoi County General Sessions Judge was R.O. Smith. In
Tennessee, the voters elect general sessions judges. TENN. CODE ANN. § 16-15-202(a) (Supp.

2002).
14.

In contrast to the nearly 93 million cases that were filed in state courts in
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not in the United States Supreme Court. 5 If we want to have meaningful
discussions about judicial review, its form, and alternatives to it, we would be
foolish not to consider the state courts and the manner in which judicial review
affects practice and decisions there.
So how is judicial review exercised by state courts, which impact far more
of this country's citizens? To answer this question, I turn to the second
perspective from which I address the topic ofjudicial review-the perspective
of a state court judge. As both a circuit and appellate court judge, and as a
supreme court justice, I faced, more than occasionally, challenges to local
ordinances and state statutes. Those challenges were most frequently raised
in cases I heard in criminal court and on the Tennessee Court of Criminal
Appeals. In fact, at the appellate court level, constitutional challenges were
raised in a majority of the cases. Because these courts are bound to follow,
rather than make, precedent, 6 perhaps it is not surprising that those challenges
were almost never successful. Similarly, in cases before the Tennessee
Supreme Court-primarily in criminal cases, 7 but also in a fair number of
frequently sought relief by challenging the
civil cases' 8-litigants

2000 and 2001, only 2.6 million cases were filed in the federal courts in 2001.
See NAT'L CIR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS,

2002, at 10, 13 (Brian J. Ostrom et al. eds., 2003), available at
http://www.ncsconline.orglD_Research/csp/2002 Files/2002_Overview.pdf.
15. While the Supreme Court Historical Society publishes that the Court has
"more than 7,000 cases on the docket per Term," the Court generally issues
The Justices' Caseload, at
opinions in fewer than 100 cases a year.
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/justicecaseload.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2004). The
Court issued eighty-four opinions during the 2002 Term. See 2002 Term Opinionsof the Court,
at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/02slipopinion.html (last modified Oct. 2, 2003).
16. For Tennessee's statutory provisions conferring jurisdiction on the lower courts, see
TENN. CODE ANN. § 16-10-101 (1994) (circuit courts); § 16-5-108 (criminal appellate courts).
17. See, e.g., State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 26 (Tenn. 1996) (upholding the
constitutionality of the "especially heinous" aggravating circumstances statutory provision for
imposition of the death penalty); State v. Hines, 919 S.W.2d 573, 583 (Tenn. 1995) (upholding
the constitutionality of imposing the death penalty under the felony murder aggravating
circumstances statutory provision); Sands v. State, 903 S.W.2d 297, 301 n.7 (Tenn. 1995)
(upholding the constitutionality of the state's post-conviction statute of limitations); State v.
Walker, 893 S.W.2d 429,430-31 (Tenn. 1995) (upholding the constitutionality of Tennessee's
felony murder statute).
18. See, e.g., Vogel v. Wells Fargo Guard Servs., 937 S.W.2d 856, 862 (Tenn. 1996)
(upholding the constitutionality of Tennessee's workers' compensation statute); Brown v.
Campbell County Bd. of Educ., 915 S.W.2d 407, 417 (Tenn. 1995) (reversing the trial court's
finding that state workers' compensation statutes were unconstitutional); Richardson v. Tenn.
Bd. of Dentistry, 913 S.W.2d 446, 459 (Tenn. 1995) (upholding the constitutionality of a civil
penalty statute regarding the unlicensed practice of dentistry); In re Burson, 909 S.W.2d 768,
777 (Tenn. 1995) (upholding the constitutionality of a statute allowing "agents" to appear on
behalf of taxpayers at hearings before the State Board of Equalization).
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constitutionality of legislative acts. During my tenure, however, none of those
challenges was successful. 9
If judicial review is an opportunity for the courts to flex their political
muscles 2 and to rule in accordance with their views of what the law should
be,2 ' why are the challenges to the constitutionality of statutes so rarely
successful? In almost every case, the answer is simple: judicial restraint. Or,
to put it another way, the courts often exhibit legislative deference.
Let me be more specific. In a number of cases, I, along with a majority of
my colleagues on the court--or at least enough to have made a good attempt
at becoming the majority-disagreed with a challenged legislative
enactment. 2 Had we been senators or house members, we would have voted
19. In one case, State exrel. Newsom v. Biggers, 911 S.W.2d715 (Tenn. 1995), the court
arguably declared a judicial act to be in derogation of the Tennessee Constitution, but the
litigant was afforded no relief. After pleading guilty to shoplifting, the Biggers appellant
challenged the sentence imposed by the judge of the Jackson City Court. Id. at 716. Although
the judge had been elected, it was not to an eight-year term as required by article IV, section
4 of the state constitution. Id. Relying on a prior decision, State ex rel. Town of South
Carthagev. Barrett,840 S.W.2d 895 (Tenn. 1992), the Biggers Court acknowledged that the
city court could not qualify under the state constitution as an "inferior court" with jurisdiction
over state offenses but, nonetheless, upheld the city court's sentence because "'a judge defacto
is a judge de jure as to all parties except the state, and ...his official acts ... are binding on
third persons and the public."' Id. at 717-19 (quoting 48A C.J.S. Judges § !1(1981)).
20. Professor Tushnet, for example, has asked "only that judges not delude themselves
into thinking that what they do has significance different from, and broader than, what every
other political actor does." Mark Tushnet, The DilemmasofLiberal Constitutionalism,42 OHIO
ST. L.J. 411,425-26 (1981).
21. Again, Professor Tushnet has also espoused this view when, in reference to the
Supreme Court, he stated: "I no longer believe that constitutional theory constrains or is
supposed to constrain Justices. Rather... it serves primarily to provide a set of rhetorical
devices that Justices can deploy as they believe effective." Mark Tushnet, Constitutional
Interpretation,Character,and Experience, 72 B.U. L. REv. 747, 756 (1992). And, about
"judging" in general, Professor Tushnet has stated: "Judicial review is an 'all or nothing'
proposition. Either one allows judges to do whatever they want or one allows majorities to do
whatever they want. Either choice is deeply anticonstitutional-which means, I suppose, that
constitutionalism is self-contradictory." Mark V. Tushnet, JudicialReview, 7 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 77, 77 (1984).
22. Perhaps this sentiment-and the exercise ofjudicial restraint-was exemplified in the
case that follows, one of the many cases in which litigants asked the court to "overrule" the
Tennessee General Assembly. In an effort to control escalating insurance costs in 1992, the
legislature redefined and limited the rights that injured workers had under the Tennessee
workers' compensation statutes. This new legislative scheme included, for the first time,
maximum compensation amounts--or "caps"-for permanently partially-disabled workers. See
Workers' Compensation Reform Act, 1992 Tenn. Pub. Acts 900, § 16 (codified at TENN. CODE
ANN. § 50-6-241 (1999)). The statute was soon challenged in Brown v. Campbell County
Board ofEducation, and, at trial, the judge found it to be "'arbitrary, capricious, illegal, and
unconstitutional because it violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment... and unfairly discriminates between workers whose medical problems are
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against the act. Indeed, on many of the matters, some of us would have done
everything in our power as legislators, or as citizens, to keep the act from
being passed. But when we reviewed the act as judges-placed in this
position by able counsel who raised the issue and armed with the American
tool of judicial review-we often upheld the offensive act. But why?
In answering that question, I will also be offering support for my
23
Pollyanna view ofjudicial review. The reason that constitutional challenges
so rarely succeed, in my experience, is that judges give great deference to
legislative acts, sometimes even straining to find acts constitutional, because
of their legal and ethical responsibilities to do so.
First, I address the legal responsibilities of judges who are asked to
declare a legislative act unconstitutional. In judicial decision-making,
"[c]onsiderations of propriety, as well as long-established practice, demand
that [judges] refrain from passing upon the constitutionality of [a legislative
24
'
act] unless obliged to do so." Although it would be more convenient for the
parties and the public if the courts promptly decided whether the assailed
legislation is valid, this fact cannot justify departure from these settled rules.

such
recognized by [an American Medical Association text] and those whose problems are not,
trial
the
(quoting
411
at
S.W.2d
915
Brown,
as mental trauma and chronic pain syndrome."'
of
constitutionality
the
challenges
who
litigant
a
upon
placed
burden
court). Noting the heavy
Court
Supreme
Tennessee
the
constitutionality,
of
favor
in
presumption
the
and
a statute
reversed the trial court and held that the "plaintiffs have failed to carry their burden of showing
that [the statutes] are not reasonably related to any legitimate state interests." Id. at 417 (citing
the
numerous Tennessee Supreme Court decisions in support of the plaintiffs' high burden and
presumption of constitutionality).
23. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
24. Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 279 (1919) (noting further that such an
it");
obligation arises "when the question is raised by a party whose interests entitle him to raise
is a
see also Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Eng'g, P.C., 467 U.S. 138, 157 (1984) ("It
questions
constitutional
reach
not
will
fundamental rule ofjudicial restraint... that this Court
323
in advance of the necessity of deciding them."); Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. McLaughlin,
process
the
in
other
any
than
rooted
deeply
more
doctrine
one
is
there
("If
(1944)
U.S. 101, 105
of
of constitutional adjudication, it is that we ought not to pass on questions
976
Galbreath,
v.
Firestone
unavoidable.");
constitutionality.., unless such adjudication is
and
F.2d 279, 286 (6th Cir. 1992) ("Deciding constitutional issues only after considering
judicial
of
rule
'fundamental
a
is
decision
the
for
ground
nonconstitutional
every
rejecting
restraint."' (quoting Three Affiliated Tribes, 467 U.S. at 157)); State v. Taylor, 70 S.W.3d 717,
720 (Tenn. 2002) ("It is well-settled... that courts do not decide constitutional questions unless
the
resolution is absolutely necessary to determining the issues in the case and adjudicating
not
do
("[C]ourts
1995)
(Tenn.
926
923,
S.W.2d
908
State,
v.
Owens
parties.");
the
of
rights
of
determination
for
decide constitutional questions unless resolution is absolutely necessary
the
considering
("[W]hen
721
at
S.W.3d
70
Taylor,
cf
the case and the rights of the parties.");
constitutionality of a statute, courts have a duty to adopt a construction which will sustain the
statute and avoid constitutional conflict if at all possible, and this duty requires courts to indulge
every presumption and resolve every doubt in favor of the statute's constitutionality.").
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As Justice Brandeis noted in his Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley AuthoriV 5
concurrence, "'[T]he power to declare a legislative enactment void is one
which the judge, conscious of the fallibility of the human judgment, will
shrink from exercising in any case where he can conscientiously and with due
regard to duty26 and official oath" decline the responsibility.' 28
In my experience, judges in literally hundreds of state and federal court
decisions have scrupulously adhered to the same rules-as summarized by
Justice Brandeis in his Ashwander concurrence29-- that the United States
25. 297 U.S. 288 (1936).
26. The Tennessee Code of Judicial Conduct provides that "[a] judge shall be faithful to

the law[] and maintain professional competence in it." TENN. SUP. CT. R. 10, Code of Judicial

Conduct Canon 3(B)(2) (2003).
27. The oath of office taken by Tennessee judges is similar to that taken by the judges in
other states.
Before entering upon the duties of office, every judge and chancellor in this state is
required to take an oath or affirmation to support the constitutions of the United States and
that of this state, and to administer justice without respect of persons, and impartially to
discharge all the duties incumbent on a judge or chancellor, to the best of the judge's or
chancellor's skill and ability.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-1-104 (1994).

28. Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 345 (Brandeis, J., concurring) (quoting I THOMAs M.
COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LtMITATIONs

332 (8th ed. 1927)).

29. Along with the decisions in which they were announced, Justice Brandeis listed the
following "series of rules under which [the Court] has avoided passing upon a large part of all
the constitutional questions pressed upon it for decision":
1. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation in a friendly, nonadversary, proceeding, declining because to decide such questions "is legitimate only in
the last resort, and as a necessity in the determination of real, earnest and vital controversy
between individuals. It never was the thought that, by means of a friendly suit, a party
beaten in the legislature could transfer to the courts an inquiry as to the constitutionality
of the legislative act." Chicago & Grand Trunk Ry. v. Wellman, 143 U.S. 339, 345
[(1892)].
2. The Court will not "anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the
necessity of deciding it." Liverpool, N. Y.& P. S.S. Co. v. EmigrationCommissioners, 113
U.S. 33, 39 [(1885)]; Abrams v. Van Schaick, 293 U.S. 188 [(1934)]; Wilshire Oil Co. v.

UnitedStates, 295 U.S. 100 [(1935)]. "It is not the habit of the Court to decide questions
of a constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case." Burton
v. UnitedStates, 196 U.S. 283, 295 [(1905)].
3. The Court will not "formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by
the precise facts to which it is to be applied." Liverpool, [113 U.S. at 39]. Compare
Hammond v. Schappi Bus Line, 275 U.S. 164, 169-172 [(1927)].

4. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented
by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be
disposed of. This rule has found most varied application. Thus, if a case can be decided
on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a question of
statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide only the latter. Siler v.
Louisville &Nashville R. Co., 213 U.S. 175, 191 [(1909)]; Light v. UnitedStates,220 U.S.
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Supreme Court developed for its own use in determining whether to address
Nevertheless, I suspect we focus on the
a constitutional issue.
aberrations-those rare times when constitutional attacks on statutes are
successful-and not upon the rule.
Despite the view of many critics,30 I believe it is unfair to visualize judges
huddled eagerly by a large bonfire, awaiting constitutional challenges to
legislative acts, and desirous of ripping the pages out of statute books and
plunging them into the flame. Rather, I think that judges diligently refrain
from ruling on constitutional grounds because well-established law requires
the declination. 3'
A second broad reason I give for my adoption of the "judicial review is
32
just right" view is the ethical obligation of judges. Again, it is interesting
that Chief Justice Marshall also relied on the oath of office as support for
judicial review.33 He persuasively asked, "Why does a judge swear to

523, 538 [(1911)]. Appeals from the highest court of a state challenging its decision of a
question under the Federal Constitution are frequently dismissed because thejudgment can
be sustained on an independent state ground. Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45, 53
[(1908)].
5. The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint of one who fails
to show that he is injured by its operation. Tyler v. The Judges, 179 U.S. 405[, 406-07
(1900)]; Hendrick v. Maryland,235 U.S. 610, 621 [(1915)]....
6. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at the instance of one
who has availed himself of its benefits. Wall v. ParrotSilver & CopperCo., 244 U.S. 407,
411-412 [(1917)]; St. Louis Malleable CastingCo. v. PrendergastConstructionCo., 260
U.S. 464[, 472-73 (1923)].
7. "When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a
serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first
ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may
be avoided." Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 [(1932)].
concurring).
Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 346-48 (Brandeis, J.,
30. Literally hundreds of scholars have criticized the courts, particularly the Supreme
Court, for their exercise of judicial review. For a small sampling of these articles, see Rachel
E. Barkow, More Supreme Than Court? The Fallof the PoliticalQuestion Doctrine andthe
Rise of JudicialSupremacy, 102 COLuM. L. REv. 237 (2002); Neal Devins & Louis Fisher,
Judicial Exclusivity and PoliticalInstability, 84 VA. L. REv. 83 (1998); Michael Stokes
Paulsen, The Most DangerousBranch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J.
217 (1994).
31. See supra note 29.
32. The Model Code of Judicial Conduct, some version of which is in effect in every
state, establishes standards of ethical conduct for judges through canons and, under some of
these canons, specific rules. Among topics included are the judge's obligation to be faithful to,
and competent in, the law, MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(B)(2) (1999); to rule
impartially and independently, see id. Canon I & cmt.; to exercise diligence, id. Canon 3(C)(1);
and to avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety, id.Canon 2. For equivalent
standards in Tennessee, see TENN. SUP. CT. R. 10 (2003).
33. The relevant passage from Marbury is as follows:
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discharge his duties agreeably to the constitution of the United States if that
constitution forms no rule for [the] government... and cannot be inspected
by [the judge]?" 4 Modem-day judges take oaths to uphold their state and
federal constitutions35 "without fear or favor" a6 and additionally are bound by
countless rules in the applicable state's Code of Judicial Conduct. a7
Thus, it has been both my personal and professional experience that the
vast number ofjudges called upon to exercise judicial review are tempered in
doing so by ethical and legal rules to which they scrupulously adhere.
However, these observations do not fully address Professor Tushnet's
concerns. Specifically, he also has expressed concern that judicial review
weakens the sense of responsibility of the citizenry and democracy 3 8-what
he calls "democratic debilitation. 3 9
Recently, the Lord Chancellor of Britain,4' Lord Irvine, commented that
Britain's fifty-year failure to incorporate the European Convention on Human
Rights41 into British domestic law was attributable to two misconceptions.42

The oath of office, too, imposed by the legislature, is completely demonstrative of the
legislative opinion on this subject. It is in these words, "I do solemnly swear that I will
administerjustice without respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich;
and that I will faithfully and impartially discharge all the duties incumbent on me as
according to the best of my abilities and understanding, agreeably to the constitution,and
laws of the United States."
Why does a judge swear to discharge his duties agreeably to the constitution of the
United States, if that constitution forms no rule for his government? if it is closed upon
him, and cannot be inspected by him?
If such be the real state of things, this is worse than solemn mockery. To prescribe, or
to take this oath, becomes equally a crime.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 180 (1803).
34. Id.
35.

See, e.g., supra note 27.

36. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon I cmt.
37. See supra note 32.
38. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Policy Distortion and Democratic Debilitation:
Comparative Illumination of the CountermajoritarianDifficulty, 94 MICH. L. REv. 245, 245
(1995). See generally MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS

(1999); Mark Tushnet, Address at the Marbury v. Madison: 200 Years of Judicial Review in
America Symposium at the University of Tennessee College of Law 120-21 (Feb. 21, 2003)
(transcript on file with the Tennessee Law Review).
39. Tushnet, supra note 38, at 247.
40. In June 2003, Prime Minister Tony Blair proposed cabinet reforms that would include
abolishing the post of Lord Chancellor, which has existed in Britain for some 1400 years.
Reuters,

British to

Abolish

Lord

Chancellor Post (Jun.

14,

2003),

at

http://nation.ittefaq.com/artman/exec/view.cgi/4/2465. Prior to stepping down, Derry Irvine,
the last Lord Chancellor other than Lord Falconer's transitionary role in the post, fell under
criticism for his expenditures and personal travels in 2003.
41. The European Convention on Human Rights (and its five protocols) may be
viewed at the website for the European Court of Human Rights, located at
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The first he described as the "outdated-and exaggerated-view of the
efficacy of political accountability as a means of securing the protection of
fundamental rights."43 The second misconception was said to be "a fear of
undermining Parliamentary Sovereignty and transferring power to [the
judiciary]."" Is it not noteworthy that the challenges faced by45 those who
desired the passage of the European Convention on Human Rights are largely
identical to the criticisms leveled at judicial review in the United States?
Up to this point, all of my comments have addressed the second
misconception (i.e., why I think the "fear" of judicial review is overstated).
Now turning to the first misconception, I raise some concerns regarding the
review
notion of self-governance and try to counter the fear that judicial
46 Perhaps an
democracy.
representative
and
weakens public responsibility
example will suffice. After 56 campaigns of referenda to voters, 480
campaigns to state legislatures, 47 campaigns to state constitutional
conventions, 277 campaigns to state political party conventions, 30 campaigns
to presidential party conventions, 19 campaigns to 19 successive Congresses,
and 52 years, legislative interpretations that the United States Constitution
47
forbade women the right to vote were replaced with the Nineteenth
Amendment, finally granting women suffrage." That is self-governance.
Similarly, in 1870 the British Parliament deemed women not to be
qualified for jury service by converting the common-law rule-the "defect of
5
continued that
sex" doctrine 49-into statutory law. " Legislative supremacy
5
law.
the
changed
later
Parliament
until
years
fifty
for
rule

http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/BasicTexts.htm.
42. Lord Chancellor Derry Irvine, The Human Rights Act-So Far So Good, Speech
Before El Illustre Colegio de Abogados de Madrid [The Illustrious Bar Association of Madrid]
(Feb. 14, 2001), availableat http://www.dca.gov.uk/hract/madrid.pdf.
43.
44.
45.

Id.
Id.
Id.

46.

See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.

47. CARRIE CHAPMAN CATT & NETTLE ROGERS SHULER, WOMAN SUFFRAGE AND
POLITICS: THE INNER STORY OF THE SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT 107 (1923). See generally U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (requiring a proportional decrease in a state's congressional
representation only when "male inhabitants" are denied the right to vote).
48. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX ("The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not
be denied or abridged.., on account of sex.").
49. Under the English common-law doctrine ofpropter defectum sexus (i.e., the doctrine
of defect of sex), women were excluded from juries. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*362.
50. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 533 n. 13 (1975) ("[The defect of sex doctrine] was
made statutory by Parliament in 1870, 33 & 34 Vict., c. 77, and then rejected by Parliament in
1919, 9 & 10 Geo. 5, c. 71.").
51. Id.

TENNESSEE LA W REVIEW

(Vol. 71:275

Contrast those efforts to establish what I think we all must admit are
noncontroversial rights (women's rights to vote and to serve onjuries) with the
efficiency ofjudicial review. As a comparative illustration, consider that, until
the 1970s, the states of Missouri52 and Louisiana" had constitutional and
legislative provisions that made it either less likely or more difficult for
women to serve on juries. However, once presented with these state
constitutional provisions, the United States Supreme Court acted swiftly in
declaring them to be unconstitutional.54
Thus, I believe that Lord Bingham, the Senior Law Lord in England, was
right when he said that "U]udicial recognition and assertion of human rights
defined in the Convention [or the Constitution in America] is not a substitute
for the processes of democratic government but a complement to them.""
Because of the inevitable tension between the democratic right of the
majority to exercise political power and the democratic need of individuals and
minorities to have their human rights secured,56 review by a lawful, ethical,
independent judiciary is essential to secure both majority rule and minority
rights.
I close with a quote from Judge George Wythe," who wrote these words
more than two decades before Chief Justice Marshall penned the Marbury
decision:

52. See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 360 & n.8 (1979) (noting that jury pools were
nonrepresentative of the population because the Missouri Constitution "grant[s] women who
so request an automatic exemption from jury service").
53. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 523, 525 (recognizing that the number of women called for jury
service in Louisiana was "grossly disproportionate to the number of eligible women" because
the state constitution required that, to become eligible, a woman must have "previously filed
a written declaration of her desire to [serve]").
54. Duren, 439 U.S. at 360 (finding that Missouri's "systematic exclusion of women"
from jury service resulted in disproportional jury pools and "violate[d] the Constitution's fair
cross-section requirement"); Taylor, 419 U.S. at 537-38 (declaring Louisiana's constitutional
exemption in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments because "it is no longer tenable
to hold that women as a class may be excluded or given automatic exemptions based solely on
sex if the consequence is that [jury pools] are almost totally male").
55. This statement is quoted in Irvine, supra note 42.
56. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Marbury and the ConstitutionalMind: A
BicentennialEssay on the Wages ofDoctrinalTension, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1 (2003).
57. Judge George Wythe was a member of Virginia's Supreme Court of Appeals when
he wrote his opinion in Commonwealth v. Caton, 8 Va. (I Call) 5 (1782). For articles with
some information about Judge Wythe, see David E. Engdahl, What's in a Name? The
Constitutionalityof Multiple "Supreme" Courts, 66 IND. L.J. 457, 468-70 (1991); Helen K.
Michael, The Role ofNatural Law in Early American Constitutionalism: Did the Founders
Contemplate JudicialEnforcement of "Unwritten" IndividualRights?, 69 N.C. L. REV. 421,
452-53 (1991); Suzanna Sherry, The Founders' Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CHi. L. REV.
1127, 1143-45 (1987).
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[I]f the whole legislature . . . should attempt to overleap the bounds,
prescribed to them by the people, I, in administering the public justice of the
country, will meet the united powers, at my seat in this tribunal; and, pointing
to the constitution, will say, to them, here is the limit of your authority; and,
hither, shall you go, but no further.5 8

58.

Caton, 8 Va. (I Call) at 8.

